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Income and Gift Tax Implications of Interest-Free 
Loans Between Relatives1 
In the recent decision of Crown v. Commissioner, the United 
States Tax Court held that the use of interest-free loans between 
relatives does not constitute a taxable gift from the lender to the 
b~rrower.~ Only in Johnson v. United States4 had this issue pre- 
viously been entertained; in that case a federal district court 
arrived at  the same r e ~ u l t . ~  In light of the Commissioner's contin- 
1. This Comment, like the cases of Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), 
appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1977), and Johnson v. United States, 254 
F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), deals with interest-free loans between relatives, although 
it is equally applicable to interest-free loan transactions between friends. Interest-free 
loans outside family circles, however, occur much more infrequently. (Congress and the 
courts have dealt with interest-free loans that arise in a business setting. See note 6 infra). 
2. 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1977). 
3. In Crown, the taxpayer and two brothers were equal partners in an unincorporated 
company which had outstanding loans on Dec. 31,1967, of $18,030,024. They were demand 
and open account loans on which no interest was charged, and were made to 24 trusts 
established for children and cousins of the taxpayer and his two brothers. The Commis- 
sioner assessed a deficiency to the taxpayer's gift tax return for 1967, determining that 
the interest-free loans were gifts of the use of the money. The value of these gifts was 
calculated by using an interest rate of six percent and amounted to $1,086,408, or $362,136 
for each partner. 
The Tax Court rejected, for a number of reasons, the Commissioner's contention that 
loaning money interest-free is a taxable gift. The court followed Johnson v. United States, 
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), by impliedly finding that the right to charge interest is 
not a property right under I.R.C. 4 2501, and hence there is no taxable gift where a lender 
refuses to charge interest. The court also noted as grounds for its decision that: (1) al- 
though 5 2501 had been in existence for a number of years, the Commissioner had just 
begun to assert the position he took in the case; (2) the courts have consistently rejected 
efforts by the Service to subject interest-free loans to taxation; (3) policy considerations, 
such as administrative manageability, should be considered; and (4) the determination 
to treat the making of interest-free loans as a taxable event is a congressional, not a 
judicial, function. 67 T.C. at  1060-65. 
Judge Simpson led a powerful four-judge dissent by asserting that the great breadth 
of the gift tax provisions easily encompasses the gift of not charging interest on loans. He 
also argued that: (1) the courts have previously taxed transactions where interest was not 
assessed; (2) the Commissioner has a well-recognized right to correct his interpretations; 
and (3) a gift tax is legally appropriate in this situation, and it is for Congress to change 
present law if it feels that the imposition of such tax is incorrect or inappropriate. Id. at 
1065-70 (Simpson, J., dissenting). 
4. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966). 
5. The Crown majority stated that it was facing the "specific issue" dealt with in 
Johnson. 67 T.C. at  1062. I t  should be noted, however, that the loans in Johnson were 
made directly between parents and children, whereas in Crown the loans were actually 
transacted between the parent's partnership and existing trusts of which the children were 
the beneficiaries. Although both cases may be said to involve interest-free family loans, 
this factual distinction may be significant in determining whether the Commissioner 
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ued attacks on interest-free loans in general,6 it is interesting to 
note how infrequently he has struck a t  interest-free family loans.' 
Even more surprising is the fact that when the Commissioner has 
attacked such loans, he has attempted only to impose gift tax 
liability on the value of the foregone interest. Altogether ignored 
has been the income tax issue? Should interest income be im- 
puted or allocated to the lender since interest-free loans may be 
used by families to split income and pass economic  benefit^?^ 
could force families to recognize interest on interest-free loans. See notes 52-56 and accom- 
panying text infra. 
6. For examples where the Commissioner attacked interest-free loans between re- 
lated corporations based on the authority of § 482 and accompanying regulations, see 
Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. v. Commis- 
sioner, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 
1972). In Joseph Lupowitz Sons v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974), and J. 
Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), the Commissioner attacked interest-free loans be- 
tween a corporation and a corporate or an individual shareholder. In Pretzer v. United 
States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,349 (D.C. Ariz. 1961), and Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 
(1961), the Commissioner attacked, prior to the enactment of 8 483, interest-free install- 
ment sales. 
7. See Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Crown v. Com- 
missioner, 67 T.C. at  1062-63. In Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, the Commissioner 
announced his nonacquiescence in the Johnson decision. 
8. At present, there are no cases where a lender has been required to recognize interest 
income on funds loaned interest-free between relatives. The Commissioner, however, has 
issued a 30-day letter to the taxpayer in Crown asserting that the loans involved in that 
case resulted in interest income to the taxpayer-lender to the extent of the foregone 
interest. Brief for Petitioner a t  6, Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), appeal 
docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1977). The case is still pending in the Appellate 
Division of the Internal Revenue Service in Chicago. 
9. The terminology of "splitting income" is used in this Comment in its traditional 
and common tax sense, i.e., an individual "splits" income when he shifts to others a 
portion of what would otherwise be his taxable income. "Efforts to avoid progressive 
income tax rates have led to the creation of numerous devices to spread a taxpayer's 
income among several different taxpayers, often the members of his immediate family. 
This spreading is usually referred to as the 'splitting' of income." B. BIT~KER & L. STONE, 
~ E R A L  INCOME STATE AND GIFT AXATION 341 (4th ed. 1972). Splitting income is nor- 
mally accomplished with trusts, family partnerships and corporations, etc. Id. at 341-423. 
There must, however, be substance to these income-splitting transactions; otherwise, the 
courts will simply tax the income to its rightful recipient using hs authority the assignment 
of income or the "substance over form" doctrines. See notes 60-74 and accompanying text 
infra. 
Since the borrower need not pay interest for the use of the money, there is a passing 
of an economic benefit in all interest-free loan transactions. It  should be noted, however, 
that where the borrower generates income with such funds, there arguably has been a 
splitting of income. This situation is distinguishable from those situations where no in- 
come is produced with the loaned money, such as where the borrower uses the funds to 
buy a car or to obtain an education. Distinguishing between the fact that all interest-free 
family loans pass an economic benefit while only some split income is relevant because 
thus far Congress and the courts have not required an imputation of interest income to a 
lender of interest-free family loans. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. They have, 
however, required an imputation of income in transactions involving the splitting of in- 
come (e.g., trusts revocable within 10 years, private annuities, and assignments of in- 
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This inaction by the Commissioner, in combination with the 
Crown holding, leaves intact the use of interest-free family loans 
as viable estate-planning and income-splitting devices.1° 
This Comment will first illustrate how interest-free loans 
may be used by related parties to avoid the income and gift tax 
consequences of short term trusts, private annuities, and assign- 
ments of income. The viability of these illustrations depends 
upon (1) whether Congress and the courts will follow the lead of 
the Johnson and Crown cases by refusing to find a gift where 
relatives loan money interest-free, and (2) whether the inaction 
of Congress and the courts in not imputing interest income to the 
lender of interest-free family loans will continue. Considering the 
significant tax avoidance and income-splitting potential of 
interest-free loans, reliance upon receiving an affirmative answer 
to these queries may be ill founded. Next, this Comment will 
discuss possible authorities that may be invoked by the Commis- 
sioner to prevent income splitting and to tax the passing of eco- 
nomic benefits that can be accomplished through interest-free 
family loans. Finally, the Comment will explore the possibility of 
legislation in this area. 
There are a number of transactions which in substance are 
very similar to interest-free loans between relatives. These in- 
clude short term trusts, private annuities, and assignments of 
income.ll When these transactions are compared with non- 
interest-bearing loans between family members, it becomes clear 
that such loans provide a viable substitute for the enumerated 
transactions. Thus, by casting any one of these transactions in 
the form of an interest-free family loan, a lender may both avoid 
gift tax liability and shift any income tax consequences that 
would otherwise be imposed upon him. 
come), and this imputed income may presently be avoided by the use of interest-free 
loans. See notes 11-37 and accompanying text infra. 
10. Although this Comment deals with interest-free loans, it should be noted that it 
is just as applicable to low-interest loans, i.e., those loans charging interest below six 
percent. Unless interest is charged on sales or loans at  a rate between six and eight 
percent, a rate of seven percent is required by Q 482 (Treas. Reg. Q 1.482-2(a)(2)(iv), T.D. 
7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135), Q 483 (Treas. Reg. 4 1.483-l(c)(2)(ii), T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135), 
and other provisions of the Code which deal with interest rates. 
11. This list includes the primary transactions that are substantively similar to 
interest-free family loans. It is not meant to be all-inclusive. 
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A. Short Term Trusts 
In order to achieve overall family tax reduction, owners of 
income-producing property often wish to pass the generated in- 
come to relatives who are in lower tax brackets. To accomplish 
such income splitting and yet maintain control and ownership of 
the property, taxpayers frequently use a short term or Clifford 
trust.12 In general, for a trust to qualify as a Clifford trust it must 
be irrevocable for a t  least ten years or for the life of the grantor, 
and the grantor must not have power during that time to control 
the income.13 If a trust so qualifies, the income of the trust is not 
taxable to the grantor;" however, the grantor must pay gift tax 
on the value of the income interest transferred.15 If the trust does 
not qualify as a short term trust under sections 671-678 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, the grantor, in addition to paying a gift 
tax on the gifted income interest, is taxed on the income the trust 
generates. l6 
For example, assume that X transfers $100,000 in cash to 
each of two separate trusts which designate X's son, Y, as benefi- 
ciary. Trust A, which is irrevocable for eleven years (or the life of 
XI7), qualifies as a Clifford trust and directs that Y receive trust 
income for the life of the trust. Upon termination of the trust, 
either by revocation or the death of X, the corpus reverts to X or 
his estate. Trust B also specifies that Y receive trust income for 
the life of the trust, but is revocable a t  any time and thus does 
not qualify as a Clifford trust. Both trusts A and B deposit the 
corpus in a savings institution a t  5.75% annual interest. 
12. The short term or Clifford trust, also referred to as a grantor trust, is governed 
by I.R.C. §§ 671-678. 
13. I.R.C. 88 671, 673-674, 676-677. In addition, the grantor must not have "powers 
of administration" as defined by 6 675. 
14. Id. § 671. For the purposes of this Comment it is presumed that all trust income 
is distributed currently rather than accumulated. Any income, therefore, is taxable to 
either the grantor or the beneficiary, but not to the trust. 
15. Id. §§ 2501, 2511; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-l(c), T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627. An 
irrevocable gift of an income interest is valued and taxed as a single gift at the time of 
assignment rather than as a series of gifts each year as the income is recognized. Lockard 
v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 409, 412 (1st Cir. 1948); Helvering v. McCormack, 135 F.2d 
294, 296 (2d Cir. 1943). 
16. I.R.C. § 671. In those situations where the grantor of an irrevocable trust is taxed 
on a trust's income, the assignment of trust income to the beneficiaries is still taxed as a 
single gift a t  the time the assignment is made. See Lockard v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 
409 (1st Cir. 1948); Sac Rohmer, 21 T.C. 1099 (1954). See also Galt v. Commissioner, 216 
F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954). Where a revocable trust is involved, however, there may be a 
question of whether or not there is even a gift. See, e.g., Estate of Leon Holtz, 38 T.C. 37 
(1962). In such a case the grantor pays a gift tax each year as the gift is made. 
17. The actuarial life of X, who is 72 years old, is 11.0 years. This value is obtained 
from Table I, Treas. Reg. 6 1.72-9 (1960). 
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In contrast, assume that two additional trusts, C and D, are 
established, both of which, like trust A, are irrevocable for eleven 
years and qualify as Clifford trusts. With trusts C and D, how- 
ever, only a minimal amount of cash is transferred to establish 
the trust corpus. Thereafter, X makes interest-free loans of 
$100,000 to each trust. The loan to trust C is for a term of eleven 
years, while the loan to trust D is recoverable on demand. Both 
trusts deposit the money loaned in 5.75% savings accounts. 
In substance, X has achieved the same economic results with 
trusts C and D as with trusts A and B respectively, i.e., in trusts 
A and C, X may not recover the money for eleven years, while in 
trusts B and D he may recover it on demand. Moreover, in all four 
trust situations the $5,750 annual income accrues to Y as the 
beneficiary. The gift and income tax consequences, however, dif- 
fer significantly. With respect to gift taxes, X will be taxed on a 
gift of $47,040 in the case of trust A, l8 and on a yearly gift of $5,750 
in the case of trust B. lg In trusts C and D, however, there are no 
gift tax consequences since, following the Crown rationale, X has 
not effectuated any gifts by only making loans to the trusts. 
With respect to income taxes, the income of trust A is taxable 
to Y as the income beneficiary; but since trust B does not qualify 
as a Clifford trust, the $5,750 annual interest income is taxable 
to X. The income of trusts C and D, which both qualify as Clifford 
trusts, is taxable to Y. Yet trust D in substance is as revocable 
as trust B since X may demand repayment of the loan at any 
time." 
18. See note 15 supra. The value, for, gift tax purposes, of the 11-year income interest 
in trust A is determined under Treas. Reg. 4 25.2512-9(e) (1970). The regulation states 
that the tables in Treas. Reg. 4 20.2031-10, T.D. 7077, 1970-2 C.B. 183, are to be used in 
calculating the value of an income interest that is dependent on both the continuation of 
a life and a concurrent term certain, as is the case with trust A. From Table LN of Treas. 
Reg. 4 20.2031-10, T.D. 7077,1970-2 C.B. 183, is obtained the factor of .47040 for a 72 year- 
old male. (Table B of the same regulation, which gives the value of an income interest for 
a term certain, reveals a factor of .473212 for an 11-year term. It is not surprising that 
this factor is nearly identical to the above factor obtained from Table LN since X has an 
actuarial life of 11 years (see note 17 supra), which is also the length of the term certain. 
If the actuarial life of the grantor, however, is not the same as the life of the trust, the 
value of the income interest is obtained from the IRS as indicated in Treas. Reg. 4 25.2512- 
9(e)). The factor .47040 is multiplied by the principal of $100,000 to yield a $47,040 gift. 
The amount of the taxable gift is then determined by subtracting the $3,000 exclusion of 
I.R.C. 4 2503(b) from $47,040. (This assumes that X's spouse, if living, does not elect 
under 4 2513 to treat one-half of X's gift as her own.) 
19. The gift of $5,750, which represents the 5.75% annual return on the $100,000 
principal, is reduced by the $3,000 annual exclusion under 9 2503(b) to yield a taxable 
gift of $2,750. (This assumes that X's spouse, if living, does not elect under 4 2513 to treat 
one-half of X's gift as her own.) 
20. There are apparently no cases discussing the issue of whether interest-free loans, 
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These hypothetical trusts illustrate that loaning money 
interest-free to a trust is the economic equivalent of transferring 
money or other assets into trust as corpus. By using interest-free 
loans instead of trust corpus, however, a person may split income 
without abiding by the grantor trust rules of sections 671-678, as 
well as avoid the gift taxes that would otherwise be imposed. In 
addition, the estate tax consequences to the lender are more ad- 
vantageous when interest-free loans are used to fund a trust than 
when the same money is passed outright as trust corpus.21 
B. Private Annuities 
A private annuity22 is a common estate-planning tool typi- 
cally used by parents to  remove appreciating or income- 
producing property from their estates and thus allow their chil- 
dren to,benefit from further appreciation or future income.23 In 
return for the property received, the transferee-child promises to 
make annuity payments to his transferor-parent for the remain- 
der of the parents' life. Under current law, the transferor is com- 
pelled to recognize as ordinary income the interest element of the 
annuity payments.24 This interest element, which the transferor 
especially those where the grantor is the lender, should be treated as corpus of the trust. 
If and when a court is faced with this issue, a logical result would be to treat such loans 
as corpus for tax purposes. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text infra. Until authority 
is promulgated, however, that treats interest-free loans as corpus, a lender may transfer 
money into trust without abiding by the grantor trust rules of I.R.C. 0 0  671-678. 
21. In all four trusts, A, B, C, and D, the $100,000 will be included in X's estate under 
I.R.C. 06 2031, 2033, and 2038, since trusts A and B terminate on X's death (or sooner) 
and trusts C and D involve loans which naturally are part of X's estate. With respect to 
trusts C and D this is the total estate tax consequence, With respect to trust A, however, 
X must also include in his taxable estate a taxable gift of $44,040 (see note 18 supra) plus 
any gift tax paid on the gift if it was made within three years of death. I.R.C. 0 0  2001(b), 
2035(c). These same results will occur with respect to the annual taxable gift of $2,750 
from trust B. Although X will get a credit against his estate tax liability for any gift taxes 
paid, id. 0 2012, the credit will not completely offset the estate tax on the same gifted 
amounts (even though there is now a unified estate and gift tax) since the value of the 
gift is taxed for gift tax purposes at the bottom brackets of the unified tax schedule, 
whereas it is taxed at the top unified tax brackets when it is included in X's estate for 
estate tax purposes. 
22. An annuity is considered a private annuity when the transferee (i.e., the person 
making the annuity payments) is not in the business of selling annuities. If the transferee 
is in such a business, the annuity is considered a commercial annuity. I.R.C. 0 72 covers 
both types of annuities. The distinction is important because of the different tax treat- 
ment afforded private and commercial annuities. See generally [I9721 195-2d TAX 
MNGN'T (BNA) . 
23. The property is removed from the parents' estate without a gift tax because an 
annuity is in essence a sale. 
24. I.R.C. 0 72; Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43; Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53. See 
generally [I9721 195-2d TAX MNGN'T (BNA) A12 to A14. 
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must recognize on a pro rata basis as each annuity payment is 
received, is the difference between the sum of all annuity pay- 
ments and the present value of those payments.25 In addition, any 
difference between the present value of the property transferred 
and the present value of the total annuity payments is considered 
a taxable gift from the transferor to the transferee, or vice versa, 
depending on whether the transferred property or the annuity 
contract has the greater value.26 
As an example of a typical private annuity, consider the 
following: X, who is 72, transfers to Y $100,000 in return for Ys 
promise to pay X $10,000 per year for X's remaining life (actuari- 
ally determined to be eleven years). Anticipated payments over 
the eleven- year period total $1 10,000; however, the present value 
. of such payments equals only $64,123.27 The transferor therefore 
must recognize the $45,877 difference as interest income by in- 
cluding in his gross income $4,170 of each $10,000 payment re- 
ceived? In addition, the $35,877 difference between the fair mar- 
ket values of the property given (i. e., the cash of $100,000) and 
the property received (i. e., the annuity contract worth $64,123) 
is a gift from the transferor subject to gift taxen 
Compare these results with the use of interest-free loans in 
the same situation. X makes ten interest-free demand loans of 
$10,000 each to Y,  and each year demands repayment of one such 
Under present law there would be no tax effects to either 
X or Y X pays no gift tax under the Crown rationale, nor must 
25. Technically, the total of the annuity payments is called the expected return and 
is calculated by multiplying the annuity payment by the transferor's actuarial life ob- 
tained from Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1960). The present value of the total annuity payments 
is called the investment in the contract and is found in Table A(l) of Treas. Reg. 6 
20.2031-10(f), T.D. 7077,1970-2 C.B. 183. By dividing the expected return into the invest- 
ment in the contract, an exclusion ratio is obtained which reflects the percentage of each 
yearly payment which the transferor may exclude from income. See generally [I9721 195- 
2d TAX MNGN'T (BNA) A7 to A8, A12 to A14. 
26. I.R.C. § 2501. See note 24 supra. 
27. See note 25 supra. From Table I of Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1960) is obtained the 
expected life of 11.0, which is multiplied by the annuity payment of $10,000 per year to 
yield an expected return of $110,000. From Table A(1) of Treas. Reg. 4 20.2031-10(f), 
T.D. 7077, 1970-2 C.B. 183 is obtained a factor of 6.4123, which is multiplied by the an- 
nuity payment of $10,000 to give $64,123, the investment in the contract. 
28. See note 25 supra. Dividing the expected return of $110,000 into the investment 
in the contract of $64,123 gives a 58.3% exclusion ratio. Thus, 41.7% of each $10,000 
payment is included in income. , 
29. I.R.C. § 2501. The gift of $35,877 is reduced by the $3,000 annual exclusion 
allowed by I.R.C. § 2503(b) to obtain a taxable gift of $32,877. (This assumes that X's 
spouse, if living, does not elect under 6 2513 to treat one-half of X's gift as her own.) 
30. Alternatively, X could make one loan for $100,000 and allow Y to make partial 
repayments. This would avoid the appearance of transacting what is in substance a pri- 
vate annuity in the form of interest-free loans. 
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he recognize any income as the loans are repaid, since to date 
there is no case or statutory law requring imputation of interest 
on interest-free family loans.31 X and Y have accomplished the 
same nontax results with interest-free loans as they would have 
accomplished by using a traditional private annuity, yet interest- 
free loans allow X to make a tax-free gift as well as avoid any 
recognition of interest income as he receives his money back. 
Moreover, demand loans provide greater flexibility by allowing 
the transferor to demand repayment as he wishes, instead of 
binding him to the fixed payment schedule of an annuity con- 
tract. The estate tax consequences of using an interest-free loan 
in place of a private annuity, however, should also be considered 
since they may be negative or positive.32 
C. Assignments of Income 
An assignment of income is simply the diversion of income 
from the rightful recipient to another person, usually a family 
member.33 When only income is assigned, the law requires that 
the assignor recognize the income for tax purposes since he, not 
the assignee, earned or created the right to receive it.34 If the 
income is derived from income-producing property and the as- 
signor assigns the property itself to the assignee, the assignee is 
31. But see note 8 supra and notes 38-74 and accompanying text infra. 
32. With respect t o  interest-free loans, the loaned money will be brought back into 
X's estate by repayment before X's death or by inclusion in his estate if the loans are still 
outstanding at  his death. I.R.C. 6 2031. In the case of a private annuity, on the other hand, 
the amount that will be included in X's estate is uncertain. If X dies before reaching his 
actuarial life, X's estate has no right to receive additional payments (unless the contract 
has a "guaranteed amount" clause), even though X's investment in the annuity contract 
has not been fully recovered. If X, however, lives longer than his actuarial life, he will 
receive back more than his investment in the annuity contract. The estate of X, therefore, 
will be either larger by using interest-free loans in place of a private annuity, or smaller, 
depending upon whether X dies before or after his actuarial life expectancy. It should be 
noted that where X dies before reaching his actuarial life, the unrecovered portion of his 
investment in the annuity contract effectively passes to Y without that amount ever being 
subjected to gift or estate tax. (Certain adjustments to Ys basis in the property received, 
however, may be required. See Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352.) 
33. The primary purpose of assigning one's income to another is to split income, i. e., 
to allow the income to be taxed at the lower marginal tax rates of the assignee. 
34. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See 
generally notes 64-74 and accompanying text infra. When assignment of income cases are 
analyzed, two kinds of income must be considered-earned income and passive income. 
Earned income is always taxed to the person who earned it, even though the income may 
have been assigned to another. The taxation of passive income, however, may be shifted 
in limited circumstances to another through the use of a short term trust or other device 
without the assignor giving up ownership of the income-producing property. See notes 12- 
16 and accompanying text supra. 
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taxed on the income generated.35 Whether the assignor has as- 
signed the income-producing property or merely the income, he 
is liable for a gift tax on the fair market value of the property or 
income assigned.36 Thus, if X has $100,000 in a 5.75% saving 
account and assigns the $5,750 annual income to Y,  X will be 
both taxed on the yearly income and subject to gift tax on the 
same amount. If, instead, X transfers the $100,000 to Y,  X must 
pay gift tax on the $100,000 assignment; however, the interest 
income will thereafter be taxed to Y. 
As with previous examples, the income and gift taxes im- 
posed upon X by the law governing assignments of income may 
be avoided by the use of interest-free loans. Suppose X loans Y 
$100,000, which Y promptly deposits in a 5.75% savings account. 
Based on the absence of any interest imputation under current 
law and following Crown, X will pay no gift or income taxes in 
connection with the transaction and Y will be taxed on the $5,750 
annual interest income. As a result, X has effectively shifted the 
taxation of the $5,750 annual income to Y without giving up 
ownership of his assets. In addition, where interest-free loans are 
used a n d  Y invests the loaned money in income-producing prop- 
erty, any appreciation in the value of such property that would 
have been X's had he owned the property is shifted to Y. Al- 
though the use of such loans may require X to take money out of 
current investments in order to make the loans, as well as require 
Y to reinvest the loaned funds, the tax savings, especially where 
passive investments are involved, may mitigate whatever burden 
is involved. Also, the beneficial estate tax consequences offer fur- 
ther incentive for using interest-free loans as a substitute for an 
assignment of incomee3' 
35. This is the "tree-fruit" distinction promulgated by Justice Holmes in Lucas v. 
Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930). If the tree (i.e., the income-producing property), not just 
the fruit of the tree (i.e., the income), is assigned, the income is attributable to the 
assignee. If the assignor, however, retains too much control over the property after assign- 
ing it, he has not really assigned the tree, and will therefore be taxed on any income 
generated. 
36. I.R.C. $ 2501. 
37. Where either an interest-free loan or an assignment of income is involved, the 
principal of $100,000 is included in X's estate. With respect to an assignment of income 
transaction, however, X must also include in his estate the annual taxable gift of $2,750 
to Y and any gift taxes paid on gifts made within three years of death. I.R.C. $ 0  2001(b), 
2035(c). The $2,750 yearly taxable gift is obtained by reducing the $5,750 interest income 
by the $3,000 exclusion of O 2503(b). (This assumes that X's spouse, if living, does not 
elect under 6 2513 to treat one-half of X's gift as her own.) 
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The preceding comparisons demonstrate how interest-free 
loans between relatives may effectively be used to shift income 
and avoid gift and income taxes. In spite of this significant 
income-splitting and tax avoidance potential, the untaxed use of 
such loans has produced little litigation38 and virtually no com- 
ment.39 This Comment will now examine the possibilities for sub- 
jecting interest-free family loans to gift and income taxation in 
order to close off what many would consider to be a substantial 
tax loophole. It should be noted a t  this point that although gift 
and income taxes are two different taxes having their own law, 
they nevertheless affect each other in many situations. For exam- 
ple, if the courts or Congress find or create authority to impute 
or allocate income to the lender of interest-free loans, it would 
necessarily seem to follow that the courts must reverse Crown and 
impose a gift tax on the transfer of such imputed income to the 
borrower. 40 
A. Gift Taxation of Interest-Free Loans Between Relatives 
The question of whether or not loaning funds interest-free 
involves a taxable gift from the lender to the borrower was an- 
swered in the negative in both Johnson and Crown. The more 
recent Crown decision followed Johnson in impliedly finding that 
the right to charge interest on money is not an interest in property 
under the gift tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, there- 
fore expressly holding that the forbearance to charge interest is 
not a taxable gift within the purview of these  provision^.^^ The 
court concluded that it is a legislative function to make the fail- 
38. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra. 
39. The only substantial discussion of interest-free family loans followed in the wake 
of Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966). See, e.g., Hooton, Gift 
Tax Analysis of Non-Interest Bearing Loans, 54 TAXES 635 (1976); O'Hare, The Taxation 
of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (1974); 5 HOUS. L. REV. 138 (1967); 65 MICH. 
L. REV. 1014 (1967); 19 STAN. L. REV. 870 (1967). 
40. Where the Commissioner has imputed interest income to the lender in the past 
he has allowed a corresponding deduction to the related borrower. Treas. Reg. 9 1.482- 
l (d) ,  T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218. If this occurs with respect to interest-free family loans 
(i.e., the lender recognizes interest income and the borrower gets a deduction), it will be 
very difficult to argue that the borrower has received no gift since any income earned with 
the loaned funds remains in the borrower's pocket while the lender pays the income tax 
on it. But cf. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947) (trust income taxed 
to the grantor of a Clifford trust held to not constitute a gift from the grantor to the trust 
beneficiaries because the grantor never owned or had any right to receive the income). 
41. 67 T.C. at 1062-64. 
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ure to charge interest on family loans a taxable event subject to 
gift tax.42 
Taking a contrary view, the four dissenting judges in Crown, 
along with all the commentators on the earlier Johnson case,43 
cogently argued that the right to charge interest is clearly an 
interest in property subject to the broad gift tax provisions of the 
Code. They also severely criticized the other bases relied upon by 
the majorities in Johnson and Crown.44 Because the competing 
legal and policy considerations of imposing a gift tax on interest- 
free family loans have been adequately identified and criticized 
by the Johnson and Crown opinions, as well as the previously 
mentioned commentators, a further in-depth analysis of this 
issue will be deferred to those sources in an effort to more thor- 
oughly discuss the income tax issues. 
B. Income Taxation of Interest-Free Loans Between Relatives 
Although the imposition of a gift tax on the use of interest- 
free family loans has been attempted by the Cornrni~sioner,~~ re- 
jected by the and analyzed by the  commentator^,^^ there 
has been only brief r ec~gni t ion~~  of the equally fascinating and 
- - - 
42. Id. For other bases of the decision, see note 3 supra. 
43. See note 39 supra. 
44. See note 3 supra. 
45. See note 7 supra. 
46. See notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra. 
47. See note 39 supra. 
48. See O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1092 
(1974); note 8 supra. It  should be observed that, while this Section of this Comment deals 
with imputing interest income to the lender, there are a number of cases where the 
Commissioner has tried to impute income to the borrower of interest-free loans. Joseph 
Lupowitz Sons v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974); J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 
1083 (1961). The courts in these cases rejected the Commissioner's contention that 
interest-free loans from a corporation to its shareholders constitute dividend income to the 
shareholders. These cases, however, are not on point when discussing the income tax issues 
surrounding interest-free family loans; rather, they address themselves more to the issue 
of whether such loans constitute a gift from the lender to the borrower. (The Crown 
majority used the above cases for this latter purpose, although the dissent felt such 
reliance was unjustified). The reason that Lupowitz and Dean are relevant to the gift tax 
issue rather than the income tax issues involved in interest-free family loans is easily 
explained. When money is loaned interest-free a benefit accrues to the borrower since he 
has the free use of a valuable asset. In a business situation where money is loaned interest- 
free from a corporation to its shareholders or officers, i t  is arguable that this free use of 
money is a dividend or compensation. In a family or nonbusiness situation, on the other 
hand, the argument is that the benefit conferred is not compensation or a dividend, but 
rather a gift. This is why the Commissioner tried to impute income to the borrower in the 
business settings of Lupowitz and Dean while claiming a gift had been made in the family 
transaction of Crown. Forcing the imputation of interest income to the lender (and a 
corresponding deduction to the borrower), however, as in 4 482 transactions, is a different 
issue than the issues dealt with in Crown, Lupowitz, and Dean. 
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somewhat more complex issues of whether income should be im- 
puted to the lender of interest-free loans transacted in a family - 
setting as has been done with interest-free loans arising in a busi- 
ness c ~ n t e x t * ~  and, if so, whether the actual income generated 
should be allocated to the lender or whether a standard rate of 
interest should be imputed regardless of the income actually gen- 
erated with the loaned funds.50 
The earlier comparisons illustrated the usefulness of interest- 
free family loans in allowing the lender to avoid or shift the inci- 
dence of income taxation. The use of interest-free loans effec- 
tively avoids the recognition of interest income that would other- 
wise accompany a private annuity contract. The short term trust 
and assignment of income illustrations indicated the utility of 
interest-free loans in shifting the taxation of income from the 
lender to the borrower. Such shifting would not always be possi- 
ble when using a trust or assignment of income.51 The only way 
to prevent this tax avoidance or splitting of income is to require 
an allocation or imputation of income back to the lender of 
interest-free loans. The question then becomes: Does authority 
exist that can be invoked by the Commissianer to require such 
imputation or allocation of income to the lender? Possible author- 
49. See note 6 supra. See also, I.R.C. §§ 72, 482, 483. 
50. There is a technical distinction between "allocation" and "imputation." Alloca- 
tion is the assessment to the lender of the actual income produced by the borrower with 
the loaned funds, whereas imputation is the assessment to the lender of a fixed percentage 
of interest income without regard to whether any income is actually generated with the 
loaned funds. I.R.C. 4 6  72 and 483 are examples of income imputation. On the other hand, 
5 482 is an example of one instance in which Congress has given the Commissioner the 
authority to allocate income between entities to reflect income correctly. The Commis- ' 
sioner has used his § 482 powers to allocate income between related corporations where 
loans are made interest-free. I t  is interesting to note, however, that the Commissioner, in 
using his power to allocate income in such situations, has actually imputed income at a 
fixed percentage without regard to whether or not any income was generated with the 
loaned funds. See, e.g., Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); 
Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Commis- 
sioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a), T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135. 
The reason given in the above cases was that since the interest-free use of money is a 
valuable asset, the Commissioner could impute interest income without regard to what 
the borrower did with the funds. This same reasoning would probably mandate an imputa- 
tion method rather than an allocation method of assessing income to a lender of interest- 
free family loans. This distinction is significant since the imputation method would dic- 
tate that lenders recognize income in all interest-free family loan transactions, not just 
where income is actually produced with the loaned funds. For example, 9 482, if held 
applicable to certain interest-free family loans, would require a seven percent imputation 
of income regardless of whether or not income is derived from the loaned funds. The 
assignment of income doctrine, however, if held applicable to non-interest-bearing loans 
between relatives, would require an allocation to the lender of whatever income is gener- 
ated with the loaned money. See notes 64-74 and accompanying text infra. 
51. See notes 12-21, 33-37 and accompanying text supra. 
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ities which will be discussed are section 482, the "substance over 
form" doctrine, and the assignment of income doctrine. A further 
question must be considered when analyzing each possible au- 
thority: Does the authority require imputation of income in all 
interest-free family loan transactions or just in those used to split 
income? 
Section 482 gives the Commissioner extremely broad discre- 
tion to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income . . . be- 
tween or among . . . organizations, trades or businesses, if he 
determines that such . . . is necessary in order to prevent evasion 
of taxes or clearly to reflect the income."52 Recently the Commis- 
sioner has used this statutory authority to allocate income be- 
tween related corporations where one corporation loaqed money 
to the other interest-free.53 This same power could be used to 
attack interest-free family loans. Since the statute, however, is 
only applicable to "org&izations, trades or businesses," it is 
doubtful that the Commissioner could reach those interest-free 
loans made between individuals without any connection to busi- 
ness transactions. Although it appears that this requirement seri- 
ously limits the application of section 482 to interest-free family 
loans, such may not be the case since most family loans of any 
significant size involve the use of organizations, trades, or busi- 
nesses. In Crown, for example, the interest-free loans were.ac- 
tually made by the taxpayer's partnership to trusts established 
for the benefit of relatives. Section 482 would clearly be applica- 
ble in this situation since the regulations under section 482 define 
a partnership as a trade or business and a trust as an organiza- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Also, in view of the fact that  an individual may act as a sole 
proprietor and as such conduct a trade or business, it is probable 
that any loans made between individuals for business purposes 
or uses will be found to fall within the purview of section 482.55 
52. I.R.C. $ 482. 
53. See Treas. Reg. $ 1.482-2, T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135; note 50 supra. 
54. Treas. Reg. $ 1.482-1(a), T.D. 6595, 1962-1 C.B. 43. 
55. The term "organizations" includes "a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a trust, 
an estate, an association, or a corporation." Id. $ 1.482-l(a)(l). It may have even broader 
scope, however, in view of the statement by the House Ways and Means Committee that 
the reason the term "organizations" was added to the predecessor of $482 was "to remove 
any doubt as to the application of this section to all kinds of business activity. " H.R. REP. 
No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9775 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 554, 572 (emphasis 
added). In addition, the courts have found 4 482 applicable to individuals by engrafting 
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Only those loans made purely between two individuals where the 
money is used by the borrower for personal purposes are likely to 
be exempt from the broad reach of section 482. This section is 
therefore a lethal tool the Commissioner may rely upon in requir- 
ing imputation of interest to the lender in a large number of 
interest-free family loan transactions? 
It should be observed that if and when section 482 is applied 
to interest-free loans between relatives, the provision will require 
imputation of interest to the lender in all business-related loan 
transactions without regard.to whether the borrower actually gen- 
erates income by using such funds. This interesting result is de- 
rived from the requirement imposed by the regulations adopted 
under section 482 that interest be imputed, at  a set percentage, 
in all situations?' The Commissioner is allowed, therefore, to 
"create" income in many cases, even though the express intent 
of section 482 is to allow the Commissioner to "allocate" or 
"apportion" income to more "clearly reflect the income" of an 
a sham doctrine onto § 482 in order to establish that the individual was an "organization," 
"trade," or "business." Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969); Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155, 1157 (1971), aff'd, 460 
F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972); Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114, 125 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966). 
56. Another important question is whether the Commissioner would invoke the power 
to allocate income or impute interest between family members even if he had the authority 
to do so. Many policy and administrative considerations militate against interfering with 
interest-free family loans (see notes 78-79 and accompanying text infra), and this may 
explain the Commissioner's inactivity with respect to such transactions. Indeed, it took 
the flagrant abuse manifested in the Crown facts to outweigh the Commissioner's appar- 
ent reluctance to attack family loans used to split income. See notes 3, 8 supra. 
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2, T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135. The validity of these regula- 
tions was litigated in a number of cases involving interest-free loans between related 
corporations. Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. 
v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 
1144 (2d Cir. 1972). In the lower court decision in Kahler, Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 
58 T.C. 496 (1972), the Tax Court held the regulations invalid and in conflict with the 
purpose of § 482 insofar as they allowed the creation of income. The Tax Court maintained 
that income could only be allocated between corporations when income was actually 
earned with the loaned money, and therefore a tracing method must be employed to 
determine what income, if any, was generated with the funds. Id. The Tax Court was 
overruled in Kahler, as well as in Kerry and Forman, when the Eighth, Ninth, and Second 
Circuits, respectively, found the "tracing" approach of the Tax Court unwarranted. The 
circuit courts of appeals thus sustained the regulations and the "creation of income" where 
there is no actual income to allocate. The Fifth Circuit has held similarly in Fitzgerald 
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-832 (5th Cir. 1975). But cf. Tennessee- 
Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940) (the attribution of 
income between related entities was prohibited under § 45 (predecessor of 9 482) where 
no income existed in the attributing entity). This latter case substantially predated the 
rulings by the other four circuits which have passed on the issue, and therefore, i t  is 
probable that the Sixth Circuit would hold similarly if the issue were again considered. 
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entity.58 Thus, section 482 requires the recognition of a specified 
amount of interest income by the lender, and a corresponding 
deduction for interest expense by the borrower,59 without regard 
to whether or not the incomes of the lender and borrower are 
thereby more clearly reflected. 
2. Substance over form 
Gregory v .  Helveringso established the landmark principle 
that the substance of a transaction, and not the form, determines 
the taxable consequences of tha t  transaction. This principle 
could possibly be invoked by the Commissioner as the basis for 
allocating income to the lender where interest-free loans are being 
used by the lender to effectuate what is in substance a nonquali- 
fying short term trust, private annuity, or assignment of income. 
For example, assume that  non-interest-bearing demand 
loans are made to family trusts which qualify as Clifford trusts 
(as in Crown, where $18 million was loaned to twenty-four trusts 
established for the benefit of the taxpayer's relatives61), and such 
loans comprise a substantial percentage of the assets of the trusts. 
Although sections 671-678 of the Code would normally allow the 
income of the trust to be taxed to the trust beneficiaries, a court 
should have no trouble in finding the trust to be revocable, in 
substance, since the majority of the trusts' assets may be with- 
drawn a t  any time by demanding repayment of the loans. To say 
the trusts qualify under sections 671-678 as irrevocable because 
the trust entities themselves cannot be revoked or the corpus 
removed within the prescribed time limits, while the majority of 
the assets may be withdrawn at  any time, is to ignore economic 
reality. The trusts should be considered revocable trusts and the 
lender deemed a grantor under sections 671-678, thus requiring 
the lender to recognize the income of the trust. 
The same result could be found where interest-free loans are 
used as a substitute for a private annuity. Although bona fide, if 
the loans are interest-free and a pattern of regular repayments is 
obvious, the court could find that the transaction is in substance 
58. I.R.C. 4 482. 
59. "[qf the district director makes an allocation of income, he shall not only in- 
crease the income of one member of the group, but shall decrease the income of the other 
member . . . ." Treas. Reg. 8 1.482-1(d)(2), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218. 
60. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
61. 67 T.C. 1060, 1061 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1977). 
Although the case does not expressly state whether or not the trusts were Clifford trusts, 
it is reasonable to conclude that they did so qualify since otherwise the Commissioner 
would not be trying to impute income to the lender. See note 8 supra. 
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a private annuity and thus taxable under section 72 of the Code.62 
As with section 482, the "substance over form" doctrine 
would not be applicable to all interest-free family loans. Its use 
would be limited to specific situations, depending on the facts of 
each case, where the transaction under attack is substantively the 
same as some other transaction taxable under the Code or some 
judicial doctrine.63 
3. The assignment of income d o ~ t r i n e  
Another possible theory for requiring an allocation of income 
to the lender of interest-free loans may be found in the assign- 
ment of income doctrine established in Lucas u. Earls4 and 
Helvering v.  Horst. 65 The language of Horst summarily describes 
the doctrine: 
The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation 
of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to 
receive it and enjoy the benefit of it . . . . Underlying the reason- 
ing [of those cases where assigned income was taxed to the 
assignor] is the thought that income is "realized" by the assig- 
nor because he, who owns or controls the source of the income, 
also controls the disposition of that which he could have re- 
ceived himself . . . .66 
Thus, if a taxpayer assigns income from income-producing prop- 
erty, or assigns the income-producing property but maintains 
substantial control over the property or the income, the assignor, 
as the substantial owner of the property, will be taxed on the 
income produced, although the income is actually received by the 
assignee. 
This doctrine could possibly be applied to interest-free fam- 
ily loans to require the lender to recognize as taxable income any 
62. This treatment, however, would be easy for the lender to avoid. By making minor 
alterations, such as a varied repayment schedule, the lender could negate the appearance 
of a private annuity. 
63. An argument against applying the "substance over form" doctrine to interest-free 
family loans is that such loans may be bona fide even though they charge no interest. In 
such cases the courts may have difficulty saying that these transactions are not in sub- 
stance loans just because they provide an excellent substitute for other transactions. A 
loan is not a sham simply because it charges no interest. If there is substance to the loan 
independent of the interest rate, it should be treated as a loan. 
64. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). This case produced Justice Holmes' fruit-tree doctrine: 
"[Nlo distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by 
which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew." Id. at 
115. 
65. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
66. Id. at 116-17, 119 (emphasis added). 
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income produced with the loaned funds. To determine if the 
Horst assignment of income doctrine is applicable to interest-free 
family loans, i t  is helpful to use a three-step analysis. First, is 
there an assignment of income-producing property when money 
is loaned? Second, if the loaning of money qualifies as an assign- 
ment of income-producing property, has the assignor-lender of 
the interest-free loans maintained sufficient control over the as- 
signed property so as to be treated as the  beneficial recipient of 
any income from the property?" Finally, has income actually 
been generated with the loaned funds? 
With respect to the first issue, it can be argued that loaned 
money per se is not in fact income-producing property because 
income is only produced by invested or deposited money. This 
argument is supported by the fact that  an assignment of 
potentially income-producing property has not been considered 
an assignment of income-producing property in any case using 
the Horst doctrine? In the cases where the Horst doctrine has 
been applied, the property assigned was in fact generating income 
a t  the time of the assignment? Hence i t  can technically be 
argued that interest-free loans are not income-producing property 
even though they have the potential to become such. 
On the other hand, it can be contended that the substance 
and not just the form of the transaction should be looked to, and 
whether or not money is income-producing property should not 
depend on such an attenuated subtlety (that loaned funds are 
only potentially income-producing property) in light of the fact 
that loaned funds can immediately be put to use as income- 
producing property. The distinction between income-producing 
property and potentially income-producing property loses even 
more of its persuasiveness in intrafamily, interest-free loan trans- 
actions since the related lender and borrower often decide before 
the loan is even granted that the borrower will deposit or invest 
the money to generate income.'O It appears that the more persua- 
67. The assignor is the beneficial recipient of the income in that he diverts the income 
from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants. 
[He has thus] equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained 
the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure 
those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to collect it  as the means 
of procuring them. 
Id. at 117. 
68. See generally J .  MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATION § 18 (J. Malone ed. 
1974). A likely explanation for this result, however, is that no case has considered applying 
the Horst doctrine to potentially income-producing property. 
69. Id. 
70. This is evidenced in Crown where the money was loaned between family members 
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sive view is that loaned money should be considered income- 
producing property subject to the assignment of income doctrine. 
If the loaning of money interest-free is considered an assign- 
ment of income-producing property, then the second question is 
"whether the [assignor-lender] retains sufficient power and con- 
trol over the assigned property or over the receipt of the income 
to make it reasonable to treat him as the recipient of the income 
for tax  purpose^."^^ In a traditional loan transaction, where the 
borrower pays interest to use the funds, there is no question that 
any income generated with the loaned money is taxable to the 
borrower. The lender does not have substantial control over the 
funds so as to be reasonably treated as the recipient of the in- 
come. But where a loan differs from the normal loan transaction 
because it (1) charges no interest, (2) must be repaid on demand, 
and (3) is intrafamily, it is arguable that the lender should be 
taxed on any income generated due to the extensive control he 
maintains over the income-producing property, i. e., the loaned 
Although the enumerated characteristics in combination evi- 
dence the greatest dominance over the income-producing prop- 
erty, the primary evidence of control by the lender is the fact that 
the loans are recoverable on demand. This is strongly supported 
by the fact that a grantor of a trust is not deemed to have given 
up control of the property for income tax purposes unless the trust 
is irrevocable for a t  least ten years (or for the life of the grantor) .73 
The fact that the loans are intrafamily points toward more con- 
trol by the lender over the borrower than would be the case in a 
nonfamily setting, although this element, by itself, would be in- 
sufficient to prove control if the loan was for a term in excess of 
ten years.74 The fact that the loans are interest-free does not tech- 
nically go toward proving control by the lender, but without this 
element there would be no question of an assignment of income 
with no interest charge, and then simply reinvested in a different business of the lender. 
67 T.C. at 1061. 
71. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 604 (1948). 
72. These characteristics may vary without preventing a finding that the lender has 
maintained substantial control over the income-producing property so as to be treated as 
the owner for tax purposes. For example, sufficient control to invoke the assignment of 
income doctrine could probably still be found where the loans are for stated terms of 10 
years or less rather than demand loans. See note 74 and accompanying text infra. Also, if 
a loan is interest-bearing, but at a rate obviously below the market rate, the assignment 
of income doctrine should apply to such a loan transaction just as it should to an interest- 
free loan, allowing a credit, however, for the interest that is charged. See note 10 supra. 
73. I.R.C. Q 673. 
74. Id. 
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since the lender would be receiving interest income. Again the 
primary evidence of control is the term of the loan; where the 
interest-free loan may be recovered on demand or within ten 
years, it can be persuasively argued that the lender should be 
treated as the beneficial recipient of any income generated with 
the loaned money. 
The third determination a court would have to make in find- 
ing the Horst assignment of income doctrine applicable to 
interest-free family loans is that income has actually been gener- 
ated with the funds. If no income is produced, then obviously 
there has been no assignment of income. Even if income is gener- 
ated there may be a question of whether it is measurable due to 
commingling of the loaned funds with other assets. In such a case, 
a court might either prorate income based on the relative values 
of the commingled assets, or simply impute a fixed percentage of 
income. Such proration or imputation is not part of the Horst 
doctrine, but would be a necessary extension of the doctrine 
where it is known that income has been produced but it is diffi- 
cult to specifically identify and quantify it. In any event, the 
Horst doctrine would thus be limited to only certain interest-free 
family loans, i. e., those that generate income. This, however, may 
be a desirable result since those loans which have the effect of 
splitting income could be attacked without interfering with all 
interest-free loans between relatives. 
Whether or not the possibilities discussed above for imputing 
income to a lender of interest-free loans are found applicable to 
such loans, legislation may be desirable to affirm or reverse that 
finding. One of the bases for the Crown decision was the court's 
belief that the imposition of a gift tax on interest-free family loans 
was a legislative duty.75 If and when a co.urt faces the issue of 
imputing interest on family loans which charge no interest, it  
may well use this same reasoning to refuse to allocate income to 
the lender of such loans. As a result, it is likely that Congress will 
ultimately be required to determne the gift and income tax conse- 
quences of interest-free family loans. 
With regard to the income tax issues, Congress faces a t  least 
three alternatives: (1) it can require imputation or allocation of 
interest income in all family loan transactions where interest is 
75. 67 T.C. at 1064 
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not charged,76 (2) it can require imputation or allocation only in 
specific situations, or (3) it can do nothing. 
A. Imputation in All Interest-Free Family Loan Transactions 
The legislature could require the imputation of interest in- 
come to the lender in all situations where money is loaned 
interest-free between relatives. This would specifically extend 
what Congress and the Commissioner have already done, through 
section 482 and the regulations thereunder, with respect to 
interest-free loans between related  corporation^.^^ In effect, this 
alternative would require that family members charge their rela- 
tives interest on any intrafamily loan. 
There are a number of significant implications and policy 
considerations which militate against such legislation. First, 
should family members be forced to deal at arm's length with one 
another? The court in Johnson refused to do just that, stating 
that "[tlhe time has not yet come when a parent must suddenly 
deal a t  arm's length with his ~hildren."'~ Second, the implica- 
tions that such an imputation of interest would raise must also 
be considered. If parents must charge their children interest on 
loans, must they not also charge for other family sharing, such as 
using the family cabin? Furthermore, if family sharing without 
charge is taxed, where would the line be drawn between family 
sharing and support obligations of parents? 
A third concern expressed in the Crown decision, which is 
just as applicable to imputing interest income as to imposing gift 
taxes on interest-free loans, is the enormous administrative effort 
that would be necessary to impute interest on family loans which 
charge no interest.7g This seems especially troublesome in light of 
both the doubtless widespread occurrence of interest-free family 
loans and the general repulsiveness of having the government 
interfere with such intrafamily transactions. (Nevertheless, this 
third concern has not prevented the voluminous gift and estate 
tax statutes and regulations which are aimed primarily at family 
transactions.) These and other considerations would have to be 
weighed by Congress in deciding whether to force the recognition 
of interest in family loan situations as has been done in business 
contexts. 
76. See note 10 supm. 
77. Treas. Reg. !! 1.482-2, T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135. 
78. Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966). It should be 
noted, however, that the Code is full of examples where Congress has forced- families to 
deal at arm's length with each other. E.g., I.R.C. 4 72, 483, and the gift tax provisions. 
79. 67 T.C. at 1065. 
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B. Imputation in  Specific Loan Transactions 
Because of the many administrative and familial considera- 
tions which weigh against a specific percentage imputation of 
interest income on all interest-free family loans, Congress may 
decide to attack only certain loans. Basically, this could be ac- 
complished by using an exclusion floor of a fixed amount or by 
legislating only against those loans which are used by families to 
split income. 
With respect to an exclusion floor, any lender making loans 
below a certain fixed amount would not have to recognize any 
interest income on the transaction. This is currently done with 
gifts, where a $3,000 per year per donee exclusion is allowed,80 and 
with section 483 transactions, where sales under $3,000 are ex- 
empted from its  provision^.^^ The $3,000 exemption of section 483, 
however, is imposed on each sale made by the same donor, 
whereas the $3,000 gift exclusion floor applies to the total annual 
gifts made by a donor to each donee. The aggregate method of the 
gift tax exclusion obviously would have to be the type of exclusion 
method employed with interest-free family loans since a loan 
transaction could otherwise easily be fragmented to take advan- 
tage of an exclusion applying on an individual loan basis. Exclu- 
sion floors are often employed to give taxpayers relief; however, 
a more realistic explanation is that it is more administratively 
manageable and less socially disruptive to create such provisions. 
Not only would an exclusion floor eliminate from administrative 
concern the great bulk of intrafamily loans, it would also avoid 
interfering with those smaller loans which are more likely given 
to help a child get through school or buy a car. Thus, the imputa- 
tion would only be required in larger family loan transactions 
where the loans are more likely to result in a significant splitting 
of income or avoidance of tax than a mere helping of relatives. 
A second method of limiting the number of interest-free fam- 
ily loans subject to attack would be to legislate only against those 
family loans which effectuate the splitting of income. This could 
be accomplished by allocating any income produced by the bor- 
rower back to the lender. In essence, this is what the assignment 
of income doctrine would achieve if found applicable to interest- 
free family loans; as with that doctrine, all loans which do not 
generate income would be left untouched. 
I t  is questionable whether Congress should seriously enter- 
- - 
80. I.R.C. O 2503(b). 
81. Id. O 483(f)(l). 
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tain the thought of legislating against only those loans where the 
borrower actually generates income with the funds. There seems 
to be no valid basis for distinguishing between loans which are 
used to produce interest income and those used to buy appreciat- 
ing real property. Families would soon learn to use loaned funds 
for non-income-generating purposes, such as buying a car or a 
home, and to use their own money for any income-producing 
ventures. On the other hand, this limited assault on interest-free 
family loans may have merit in that it would confirm the use of 
the Horst assignment of income doctrine as an attack vehicle, 
while also providing some authority to at least cut back on this 
substantial loophole. 
C. N o  Imputation i n  Family Loan Transactions 
A third alternative for Congress is to not enact any new legis- 
lation. This would not be an unreasonable decision in light of the 
administrative and social concerns mentioned above. Congress 
may well reason that the best alternative is to do nothing more 
with interest-free family loans; the previously discussed methods 
of forcing imputation or allocation of income are sufficient to 
reach the flagrant income tax abuses of factual situations approx- 
imating those in Crown. If such a choice is made, a viable tool 
will continue to exist with which the lender of interest-free family 
loans can avoid or shift income, as illustrated in Section I of this 
Comment. 
The comparisons and analogies of Section II of this Comment 
demonstrate the usefulness of interest-free loans as an estate- and 
income-planning tool to split income and avoid gift and income 
taxes. In addition to accomplishing the same economic results as 
short term trusts, assignments of income, private annuities, or 
other transactions, interest-free loans will often be more advanta- 
geous for tax purposes than the compared transactions. This is 
forcefully born out by the facts in the Crown case and the analo- 
gies of Section I1 of this Comment. 
To counter the viability of interest-free loans as a vehicle to 
split income and avoid income and gift taxes, a number of alter- 
native authorities could be invoked by the Commissioner to im- 
pose income taxation on lenders of interest-free loans. If a court 
ever relies on one of the authorities discussed to impute or alla- 
cate income to the lender of interest-free family loans, it should 
have little difficulty in also finding a gift from the lender to the 
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borrower. This is based on the fact that the borrower physically 
receives the income generated by the loaned funds but pays no 
interest expense, while the lender is being forced to recognize 
interest income. I t  is difficult in this situation to argue that the 
lender has not made a gift to the borrower of the interest amount. 
But unless and until the courts find and apply existing authority 
or Congress furnishes new authority to allocate income or impute 
interest to the lender, and unless and until the courts or Congress 
define the making of loans interest-free as a gift, the interest-free 
family loan will continue to exist as an excellent estate- and 
income-planning device to avoid income, estate, and gift taxes. 
Robert C .  Hyde 
